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[T]here is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more
dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.
For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only
lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order.'
INTRODUCTION
All things are constantly changing in the world, and human society
is changing and developing as well. On September 15, 1998, George
Soros testified before the United States House of Representative's
Committee on Banking and Financial Services that all countries are
part of the global capitalist system, characterized as, "a gigantic cir-
culatory system, sucking up capital into the financial markets and in-
stitutions at the center and pumping it out to the periphery either di-
rectly in the form of credits and portfolio investments, or indirectly
through multinational corporations."2 Mr. Soros stated that up until
1997, financial markets were stable, at which point the situation be-
gan to rapidly change.' Mr. Soros concluded that the collapse of the
global capitalist system will affect all financial markets and econo-
mies and could not predict with certainty which economy would fall
next.4
In today's unstable economic times, when even some developed
economies are suffering a decline, making assessments is difficult.
Nonetheless, few could deny that historically the private sector often
provides the catalyst for societal growth.' As such, the aim of this es-
1. See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE AND THE DISCLOSURES, Chap.
VI, at 21 (Luigi Ricci trans., 1950).
2. International Economic Turmoil: Hearing Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Fin. Services, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of George Soros) (vis-
ited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://www.soros.org/textfiles/speeches/091598_Banking_
andFinance.txt>.
3. See id. (commenting on the Asian crisis, which resulted in a reversal of the
flow of capital from the periphery to the center).
4. See id. (urging Congress to support international institutions including
authorizing an increase in IMF capital to provide relief to countries already in fi-
nancial crisis).
5. See Michele Balfour & Cameron Crise, A Privatization Test: The Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 84, 85 (1993) (discussing
different privatization schemes and the necessary elements for successful privati-
zation); see also Peter Rutland, Privatization in East Europe: Another Case of
Words that Succeed and Policies that Fail?, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
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say is a delineation of common features of privatization worldwide,
with an emphasis on the legal framework of privatization in Ka-
zakhstan.
Part I of this essay provides the international substance of privati-
zation, defines "privatization," and determines its forms and meth-
ods. Part II surveys the process of privatization in the Czech Repub-
lic, Poland, and Russia, with a broader review of Russian
privatization legislation, as the experience of those countries has di-
rectly affected the Kazakhstani model of privatization. Part III exten-
sively reviews the legal mechanisms of Kazakhstani privatization, as
well as the legal provisions for foreign investor participation in the
privatization process. The essay concludes by suggesting that the
privatization process in Kazakhstan has been successful in over-
coming the Soviet legacy and moving the country toward a more
prosperous society.
I. PRIVATIZATION AS A WORLD-WIDE PROCESS
The world is currently experiencing a "privatization revolution ' -
State enterprises in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America are in
various stages of privatization.7 Privatization is an inevitable part of
decentralizing a national economy. By reducing a government's role
in the management of the country, privatization forces market
mechanisms to work. As a result, advisors in countries of economic
PROBS. 1, 4-8 (1995) (discussing the different objectives of privatization, the im-
plementation of privatization programs employed, and the effects of such pro-
grams).
6. Lawrence W. Reed, President, Mackinac Center for Public Policy, Adapted
from Remarks to The Future of American Business, National Leadership Seminar
(visited Mar. 29, 1999) <http://mackinac.org/topics/privatiz/privatiz.htm> (recog-
nizing that improvements in mass communication and transportation have pro-
vided for an interdependent world, which lies at the root of today's privatization
revolution).
7. See Pace of Privatisation Doubles, PRIVATISATION INT'L, Jan. 1, 1992,
available in 1992 WL 2748240, at I (commenting that in 1991 profits from the
sale of public enterprises to the private sector increased to nearly S50 billion,
which was largely the result of privatization in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and
Britain); see also Reed, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing privatization experiences in
England). While Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister, the British government
sold seven major airports, British Telcom, many State enterprises, and a million
units of public housing. See id. As a result, British markets became more competi-
tive saving taxpayers significant sums of money. See id.
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transition regard privatization as the primary means to create a mar-
ket economy and to promote development.8
The necessity of privatization is based on human nature, which
can be described in one sentence: "What you own, you take care of;
what nobody or everybody owns falls into disrepair." 9 A strong pri-
vate sector creates more responsible suppliers and allows private
citizens to become owners. Owners are likely to closely oversee
management as they attempt to maximize profits. This naturally
leads to the desire to better serve consumers and quickly respond to
consumer demand, which creates competition, "the best governor of
markets."'" Competition among owners distinguishes command
economies from market economies, thriving in the latter and wither-
ing in the former."
In non-market countries with a centralized economy and a planned
distribution of goods, the State is "everything." By substituting pri-
vate ownership with public ownership, the State produces and dis-
tributes all goods and services. This unnatural function places a
heavy burden on the State.'2 The cost of the government's immense
growth, which is one of the characteristics of a non-market economy,
8. See Philip M. Nichols, Creating a Market Along the Silk Road: A Compari-
son of Privatization Techniques, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 299, 300 (1997)
(providing a comparison of the methods of privatization selected by each of the
five republics of Central Asia as a means of converting to a market economy); Pri-
vatization in Poland: An Interview with Jeffrey Sachs, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L.J. 441,445 (1992) (emphasizing that State ownership should play a minor role in
an economy while private ownership is essential to a market economy) [hereinafter
Sachs Interview]; Changes in Soviet Balance of Power Boost Market Prospects,
PRIVATISATION INT'L, Sept. 1, 1991, at 1, available in 1991 WL 2715792 (dis-
cussing the former Soviet republics and their plans for developing and imple-
menting privatization programs).
9. Reed, supra note 6, at 3.
10. David Gordon, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Polish Experience, 25
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 517, 518 (1994) (describing the efficient market theory).
11. See id. (stating that competition "best governs" market economies by cre-
ating incentives for maximizing profits, thus insuring lower costs and better quality
products/services for consumers).
12. See Reed, supra note 6, at 1 (reporting that although the government was
running a budget deficit the bureaucracy still could not efficiently carry out its
tasks).
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creates a public burden on millions of people." Countries short on
revenue are unable to increase taxes because they have already been
raised to a critical level-increasing taxes would likely send people,
businesses, and investors to "friendlier climates.""' After reaching
this critical point, countries instead choose to transfer State owner-
ship of commercial enterprises to private owners." In other words,
State officials, in order to stay in power, are opting to privatize.'
Some researchers assert that if privatization is done properly and
with due care, it will provide for increased market competition, ac-
countability, and incentives, resulting in rapid economic growth."
Privatization done poorly, however, can stagnate a country's econ-
omy. As such, privatization acts as a catalyst for transforming a na-
tional economy, but also requires the creation of legal, institutional,
and fiscal mechanisms.' The process of creating such mechanisms
took developed countries centuries to accomplish, yet former Soviet
countries are trying to complete the transformation process within a
few years. Some scholars argue that a working market economy can-
not be created through revolutionary policies.'9 They assert that gov-
ernments should allow State enterprises to "wither away slowly,"
allowing a legal and an institutional framework for new private en-
terprises to emerge. 0 This essay, however, does not aim to discuss
13. See id. at 1 (noting that for governments of non-market economies, eco-
nomic security took precedence over personal liberties and freedom of commerce).
14. See id. at 3 (recognizing that State officials also felt pressure to privatize
when governments fell behind with technology and advances in production).
15. See RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS
892 (3d ed. 1995) (emphasizing that privatization is a long process that must be
measured in decades rather than in years even after "the goal is made clear and ob-
stacles removed").
16. See Reed, supra note 6, at 3 (asserting that many State officials resort to
privatization as it is "the best or only" alternative they have).
17. See id. at 3 (stating that privatization has led local governments to experi-
ence cost savings of as much as 10 to 40 percent).
18. See Gordon, supra note 10, at 518.
19. See George Bogdan, The Economic and Political Logic of Mass Privatiza-
tion in Czechoslovakia and Poland, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L CoMP. L. 43, 46 (1996)
(asserting that market economies are of such a complex nature that market actors
must develop the necessary skills and practices).
20. Compare id. (advocating that Eastern European economies should grow
"spontaneously" from the private sector already in place), with Andrei A. Baev,
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different ways to create a prosperous economy, but rather concen-
trates on schemes of privatization, which is a method of achieving
prosperity.
Scholars differ on the precise definition of privatization. Some be-
lieve that privatization is "a conversion of businesses from govern-
mental ownership to private," with de-nationalization of industry and
freeing of the private sector to provide services that were previously
considered governmental.2' Privatization in its broadest sense is the
transfer of assets or services that are supported by public taxes to a
market that is supported by entrepreneurial initiative and private
competition.2 One scholar delineates privatization as "the single act
of transferring (by the means of buying and selling) the legal title of
State property, which was in the possession of State enterprises for
restricted purposes of producing certain goods under owner-State
control, to individual or associated owners."23 Although other defini-
tions reflect the essence of privatization, only the last definition em-
bodies the legal perspective of privatization.
Researchers distinguish between different forms of privatization,
recognizing that it can be accomplished as either an intermediate or
immediate process. Intermediate privatization involves the restruc-
turing of State companies into joint-stock or limited liability compa-
nies that remain under State control . Immediate privatization is the
rapid transfer of State property to private hands, and is usually ac-
companied by price liberalization and rapid changes in commercial
legislation. As a result, some believe that only immediate privatiza-
tion can produce real progress."
Civil Law and the Transformation of State Property in Post-Socialist Economies:
Alternatives to Privatization, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 131, 137 (1993) (com-
menting that privatization is a way of "completely abolishing the basis of the
whole socialist command system").
21. Privatization, available in MICROsOFT ENCARTA ENCYCLOPEDIA (1997).
22. See Reed, supra note 6, at I (asserting that the superiority of a free market
economy is now nearly undisputed).
23. Baev, supra note 20, at 150.
24. See FOLSOM, supra note 15, at 896 (stating that the restructured State com-
panies are still State-owned, however, the companies are managed separately from
the State budget).
25. See Nichols, supra note 8, at 303 (noting that western advisors generally
support rapid transformation of ownership from the public to the private sector and
[14:13991404
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Privatization can be accomplished by contracting State property to
private citizens, distributing shares in previously owned State busi-
nesses, or liquidating unprofitable State enterprises. Theorists em-
phasize that the most common form of privatization is for the gov-
ernment to contract State property to private firms."6 This form is
exercised through the execution of transparent and competitive con-
tracts between private persons or companies and the State. These
contracts usually impose few requirements on the acquiring com-
pany. Shares of State enterprises are distributed by auctions, allow-
ing large dispersions of State property into private hands. Shares can
be distributed for free, in exchange for vouchers/investment coupons,
for money payments, or for future investments. Enterprises in poor
financial condition are either liquidated by sale or the assets are
transferred to private persons.
Commercialization is another form of privatization. There are dif-
ferent opinions regarding the definition of this process. The first
opinion characterizes commercialization as the government's deci-
sion to no longer engage in certain areas of production by simply al-
lowing customers to contract with the provider of their choice."7 The
second opinion, held in most former Communist countries, charac-
terizes commercialization as the first step to privatization, by re-
structuring State enterprises into joint-stock or limited liability com-
panies with the State appointing the board of directors.' Shares of
joint-stock companies and membership in limited liability companies
can later be sold to private owners.
Researchers also recognize other forms of privatization. Such
forms include: giving or selling State property in the form of physi-
western aid agencies, such as the World Bank, primarily apply the rapid transfor-
mation process).
26. See Reed, supra note 6, at 2 (listing the requirements of successful privati-
zation as open, competitive bidding for contracts, use of precise contract terms,
and close supervision over the enforcement of contract provisions).
27. See id. (asserting that benefits of commercialization to consumers include
increased selection of producers and suppliers of goods/services providing for in-
creased consumer choices and lower consumer costs).
28. See Joseph C. Bell, Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe, 752
PLI/CoRP 385, 389 (1991) (explaining that directors are made primary sharehold-
ers of the firm to align their interests with the firm's profit maximizing interests,
thereby facilitating the transformation to a market economy).
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cal assets to private entities, distributing vouchers for investment in
State property, creating collective investment programs, leasing out
the assets of State enterprises, and offering stock to the public.2 9 As a
rule, countries undergo several forms of privatization on their road to
a free market.
To be successful, privatization in countries with centrally-planned
economies must attract foreign capital for the modernization of their
facilities, adopt foreign management skills in order to capitalize on
new technology, and provide sufficient internal financial and pro-
duction controls.3 ° To attract foreign participation, a country would
want to enact investment laws that facilitate the movement of capital
into and out of the country.3"
II. PRIVATIZATION IN FORMER COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES
Although calls for privatization began in the 1970s,32 most Com-
munist countries did not begin to privatize State enterprises until the
early 1990s. At that time, planned economies operated by producing
identical goods in the same quantities, which were purchased on a
regular basis, eventually stagnating the market.33 As a result, States
experienced large budget deficits, hyperinflation, a decline in pro-
29. See Baev, supra note 20, at 180-88 (outlining different approaches to the
privatization process); Nichols, supra note 8, at 304 (offering examples of mass
privatization); Reed, supra note 6, at 3 (listing forms of privatization).
30. See Kenneth Anderson, Three Roles for the Private Equity Market in For-
eign Investments, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 125, 126-27 (1997) (recognizing the
difficulty in attracting foreign investors since investors are aware of the illiquidity
of such investments and the need for active investment management).
31. See id. at 127 (noting that performing such functions "provides a daunting
task in many places throughout the world").
32. See Reed, supra note 6, at 1 (noting that during the 1970s, State officials
and private citizens began to look for new solutions in response to "bloated, over-
bearing bureaucracies," "crushing tax burdens," and "frightening burdens of debts
and deficits").
33. See Introduction. Privatization-The Global Scale-Back of Government In-
volvement in National Economics, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 435, 435-36 (1996) (ex-
plaining that State-owned producers overproduce unwanted goods and underpro-
duce wanted goods creating shortages of goods in demand, as central planners
cannot respond to changes in consumer demand or produce substitute goods).
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duction, and reduced living standards." The State monopoly could no
longer continue as governments soon realized that a free market sys-
tem worked, while the socialist system did not." Thus, the decline of
the Soviet-era began.
Researchers note that privatization in former Communist countries
has several unique features that have not been experienced by capi-
talist countries. Soviet economics assumed that all means of produc-
tion were concentrated in State hands.36 For at least fifty years, the
government fixed prices by special edicts and distributed goods in
accordance with plans prepared by the Communist Party. Conse-
quently, the scale and features of privatization in post-Soviet coun-
tries were different from those of developed nations. First, no other
country needed to transfer thousands of enterprises to the private
sector. Second, privatization in almost all post-Soviet countries was
completed within a short period of time-less than ten years. Third,
post-Communist countries used more radical means for transferring
State property to private owners." Furthermore, privatization in post-
Soviet countries was unparalleled in history because it dealt with a
specific collective mentality of people who were accustomed to liv-
ing in a centralized system of distribution and, consequently, had no
concept of the resourcefulness of private property."
The first important steps toward transferring State property in ex-
Communist countries were taken in 1989-1990, when almost all ex-
Communist countries started price liberalization and declared private
property rights. This necessarily predicted privatization and served as
34. See Paul B. Stephan, III, Toward a Positive Theo., of Privatization - Les-
sons from Soviet Type Economies, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 173, 182 (1996)
(providing common economic traits experienced by planned economies in re-
sponse to stagnant market conditions).
35. See Reed, supra note 6, at * 1 (quoting "[w]hat had been 'socialized' would
have to be 'privatized').
36. See Baev, supra note 20, at 133 (explaining that in socialist countries the
term "ownership" is given a unique economic meaning such that capital assets are
owned by the State and thus the community as a whole).
37. See Bogdan, supra note 19, at 44 (commenting that privatization in Eastern
Europe differs from western privatization in that post-Communist countries must
virtually create private property and capital markets where they previously did not
exist).
38. See id.
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grounds for the further development of a legal and institutional
framework for a market economy.
A. PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
1. Privatization in the Czech Republic
The Czech Republic's economy has been one of the most stable in
Eastern Europe. 9 After the break-up of the Soviet system, the Czech
government rapidly converted its State-owned economy into a sys-
tem of private enterprises. Critics found that the Czech Republic
had developed a distinct model of mass privatization marked by
unique auctions of State enterprises to voucher-holders.4' The esti-
mated State revenue from privatization of both small and large enter-
prises was US$130 billion.
Privatization began in the Czech Republic in October 1990 when
the country enacted new laws.43 Privatization was accomplished in
two waves. During the first wave, which occurred from 1990 to 1993
in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1492 State enterprises
were privatized." During the second wave, which was conducted ex-
clusively in the Czech Republic until 1995, an additional 1300 State
companies were privatized.45
During the first stage of privatization, legislation gave Czech citi-
zens and legal entities an opportunity to become private owners of
39. See id.
40. See Balfour & Crise, supra note 5, at 93 (describing Czech privatization
efforts).
41. See id. at 94 (noting Czechoslovakia's unique voucher system); Bogdan,
supra note 19, at 44 (describing the voucher system).
42. See Sarah Andrus, The Czech Republic and Slovakia: Foreign Participa-
tion in Changing Economies, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 611, 614
(1994) (discussing the evolution of investment legislation in the Czech Republic
and Slovakia).
43. See Czechoslovak Law on Transfers of Some State-Owned Assets to Other
Legal Entities or Persons, sec. 3 (1990), available in 1990 WL 488605 [hereinafter
Czechoslovak Law on Transfers].
44. See Bogdan, supra note 19, at 51 (noting that the first wave involved
Czech, Slovak, and federal firms).
45. See id.
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small enterprises.' Small enterprises were sold at auctions for money
payment. Auctions were conducted in two rounds. If an enterprise
was not sold to Czech citizens or Czech legal entities in the first
round, then foreign natural and legal persons were entitled to bid in
the second round.47 Small-scale privatization was virtually complete
by January of 1993.4
Large-scale enterprises had to propose their plans of privatization
to the Ministry of Finance, which could approve or disapprove the
proposed program.4'9 According to legislation, an enterprise could be
sold directly to a bidding company, or indirectly to citizens or in-
vestment funds. ° Legislation did not restrict foreigners from the di-
rect purchase of State enterprises, but it did limit foreigners from ac-
quiring State property through investment funds.5'
The State also tried to protect the rights of its citizens to receive
portions of State property.52 The government distributed investment
coupons strictly to Czech citizens. 3 During the first privatization
wave, investment coupons had no real price-each coupon booklet
equaled 1000 investment points. The coupons enabled the holder to
purchase shares of joint-stock companies, or to acquire a participa-
tion-interest in investment companies." During the second wave of
46. See Czechoslovak Law on Transfers, supra note 43, sec. 3.
47. See Andrus, supra note 42, at 615 (demonstrating the characteristics of the
Small Scale Privatization Act).
48. See id.
49. See id. at 616 (specifying the characteristics of large-scale privatization
enterprises).
50. See id. (noting the two methods of large-scale privatization are the direct
sale method and the voucher system).
51. See id. at 619 (describing the Participation Act).
52. See Czechoslovak Act of Feb. 26, 1991 on Conditions of Transfer of State
Property to Other Persons (Large Privatization Law) arts. 22-26 (1991), available
in 1991 WL 501310 [hereinafter Czechoslovak Act].
53. See id.
54. See Bogdan, supra note 19, at 50 (explaining the Czech model for citizens
to obtain State property).
55. See Czechoslovak Act, supra note 52, art. 25.
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privatization, investment coupons had a real money value, which
was, however, fairly low.
5 6
Czech legal and natural persons could purchase operational units
of small enterprises at auctions. 7 They also had a right to buy shares
of larger enterprises either directly at auctions or indirectly by giving
their vouchers to private investment companies." Investment compa-
nies collected the bulk of coupons. 9 As a result, 432 investment
companies controlled 72 percent of all issued coupons in the first
wave of privatization, and the nine largest companies controlled up
to fifty percent of all issued coupons in the second wave of privati-
zation.60 By November 1994, the government conducted 11,200
61
voucher auctions.
In 1998, the Czech Republic continued its privatization efforts in
the areas of banking, telecommunications, energy distribution, andfinanial • 62
financial services. As such, the Czech Republic has privatized al-
most all State commercial enterprises, mostly among its citizens and
legal entities.6 ' According to commentators, the privatization effort
56. See Speed the Essence in Eastern Europe Q. Jeffrey Sachs, PRIVATISATION
INT'L, Aug. 1, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2748768 (noting that Sachs, an advisor
to several governments engaged in privatization, strongly supported the free trans-
fer of ownership through coupons and vouchers). Sachs stated that whether citizens
should have to pay for vouchers was relatively insignificant given that thousands
of enterprises needed to be privatized. See id. According to Sachs, "[t]here are ar-
guments for and against the kind of charge Czechoslovakia has levied... In Po-
land they did an opinion survey and the public felt quite strongly that there ought
to be some charge.... In Russia the intention is to keep the charge very low." Id.
57. See Czechoslovak Law on Transfers, supra note 43, sec. 4.
58. See Bogdan, supra note 19, at 53 (explaining the investment structure of
the voucher system).
59. See Rutland, supra note 5, at 13 (noting the effect of privatization measures
in the Czech Republic).
60. See id. at 12.
61. See id. at 15.
62. See Henry Gibbon, Pressing Ahead with Structural Reforms (Privatization
of Telecommunication Companies in Central and Eastern Europe), PRIVATIZATION
INT'L, June 1, 1998, at 16, available in 1998 WL 18957823 (highlighting the ex-
pansion of privatization in the telecom sector).
63. See id. (noting the success of mass privatization efforts in Central and East-
ern Europe).
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appears to be an example of genuine democratic process.' Czech
privatization did not offer inducements to insiders of privatized en-
terprises, nor did it provide favors to workers and managers who
participated in privatization on equal footing with non-workers.
Moreover, Czech laws only placed reasonable limitations on the in-
vestment and acquisition activities of foreigners and legal persons."
Lastly, during privatization, the Czech Republic entered into treaties
with a number of countries." These treaties provide investment pro-
tection against expropriation, restrictions on private ownership
rights, repatriation of earnings, and enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights.67 As a result, the Czech Republic has experienced a rise in
domestic business activity, an expansion in trade with the west, and
an increase in the amount of foreign investment."
2. Privatization in Poland
Because Poland is the largest country in Eastern Europe in terms
of territory and population, its economy influences every Eastern
European country.69 Privatization started rapidly in 1990 when the
government lifted price controls, froze salaries, and terminated gov-
ernment subsidies to businesses.0 Polish officials are determined to
continue economic reform toward eventual stability.
Poland enacted its first privatization law on July 13, 1990.7' The
government also passed laws establishing the Ministry for Owner-
ship Transformation, which promulgated procedures for implement-
64. See id.
65. See Mark Kreisel, Czech Republic: lnvestment in Freedom and the Future.
INT'L DIMENsIONS, Fall 1997, at 6 (noting that the Czech Commercial Code pro-
vides foreign investors similar treatment to that of Czech citizens).
66. See id. (describing Czech efforts to protect property and earnings through
treaties).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Gordon, supra note 10, at 525 (noting the importance and impact of
Poland's privatization program).
70. See Sachs Interview, supra note 8, at 443 (describing economic "shock
therapy" instituted by the Polish government on January 1, 1990).
71. See Polish Privatization Law No. 169 (1990), available in 1990 WL
488624.
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ing privatization. 2 State companies were divided into two main cate-
gories-the first group comprised 500 large enterprises, and the sec-
ond group comprised 5500 small- and medium-sized enterprises." In
mass privatization, large enterprises were transformed into corpora-
tions with further offerings of shares to third persons to ensure large
diffusion of ownership, while other enterprises could be transferred
to single buyers in whole.74 Although the citizens of Poland, like the
citizens of Czech Republic, were given vouchers, they could not di-
rectly participate in auctions, but instead had to give their vouchers
to national investment funds.75 There were approximately twenty in-
vestment funds at that time.76 Arguably, it was easier for the govern-
ment to protect investors from potential fraud in light of the small
number of investment funds.
Frequent changes in the Polish government usually created
changes in privatization laws. The first plan of privatization granted
enterprise shares in the following manner: ten percent to workers at
no cost, thirty percent to all citizens in the form of vouchers, twenty
percent to pension funds, ten percent to commercial banks, and thirty
percent to Polish and foreign investors.77 Later, the government pri-
vatized State property according to another scheme: thirty-three per-
cent of the company's stock was granted to a single fund or a "core
investor," thirty percent remained in State possession for future sale
or distribution, twenty-seven percent was distributed to investment
72. See Polish Law Establishing Office of Minister for Ownership Transfor-
mation Act of July 13, 1990, art. 1, available in 1990 WL 488624.
73. See Polish Government Program for Privatization of Polish Economy, Feb.
12, 1990, at 1, available in 1990 WL 488633.
74. See Polish Privatization Law, supra note 71, chs. 1-2.
75. See Bogdan, supra note 19, at 54 (comparing Poland's privatization pro-
gram to Czechoslovakia's program). The government established half of the na-
tional investment funds. See id.
76. See Speed the Essence in Eastern Europe Q Jeffrey Sachs, supra note 56.
Sachs stated that investment funds in Czechoslovakia were allowed to "spring up,"
whereas in Poland great care was taken to license only a small number of firms.
See id. According to Sachs, "[s]pontaneity has the advantage that it gets the juices
flowing, but it has the disadvantage that people invest their money in completely
unknown entities without sufficient legal protection." Id.
77. See Polish Government Program for Privatization of Polish Economy, su-
pra note 73, art. 2.1 (specifying that any unsold, outstanding shares would return to
the Treasury).
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groups in three blocks, and the remaining ten percent was given to
employees.78
Legislation restricted foreign companies and natural persons from
establishing investment funds, but permitted them to buy shares di-
rectly at auctions or by obtaining stock options.9 Foreigners could
not obtain more than ten percent of a company's stock without a
permit from the Foreign Investment Agency.0 Polish citizens, how-
ever, could sell their investment fund shares, which they received in
exchange for vouchers, on the Stock Exchange. As such, virtually
any person, either foreign or Polish, was able to buy shares of in-
vestment funds and obtain indirect possession of State enterprises
during mass privatization."'
In 1998, upon completing small-scale and mass privatization, the
Polish government began privatizing large banks, energy firms, tele-
communications companies, insurance companies, and copper min-
ing concems.8 Privatizing only twenty percent of Polish Telecom's
shares resulted in an estimated receipt of USS10 billion. While
similar to Czech privatization efforts, Poland had its own path. Po-
land established and maintained control of a small number of in-
vestment funds in the process of mass privatization. Each employee
of a State enterprise had an opportunity to become an ovner of an
enterprise.
78. See Bogdan, supra note 19, at 54 (explaining the role of investment finds
in the mass privatization plan). See generally Lawrence S. Michel & Brian Ngo,
Case Study: Privatization in Poland (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http'//
www.worldbank.org./html/edi/cases/poland.html#briefing>.
79. See Bogdan, supra note 19, at 54 (noting that managers of privatizing com-
panies were sometimes compensated with stock options, instead of wages).
80. See Polish Privatization Law, supra note 71, art. 19.2.
81. See generally id. arts. 19.2-19.3
82. See Gibbon, supra note 62, at 16 (describing the expansion of privatization
to telecom companies).
83. See id. (noting that the sale of up to twenty percent of Polish telecom is the
country's largest equity offering to date).
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B. PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA
Privatization made its first steps in Russia in 1991.14 By that time,
however, the government liberalized prices and declared private
property rights. The Law on Privatization of State and Municipal
Enterprises of 1991 declared the State's intention to privatize State-
owned enterprises. Furthermore, it created the State Committee for
State Property, responsible for enforcement of the privatization proc-
85
ess.
During 1992-1993, the government privatized small retail and
wholesale companies, food services, State agricultural enterprises
and related repair and machine locations, unused facilities and in-
complete construction projects, and road repair facilities.86 The gov-
ernment, however, prohibited privatizing major enterprises, those
employing over 10,000 workers, and enterprises of national signifi-
cance, such as military and defense, mining and natural resources,
chemical, fuel and energy, air transportation, nuclear facilities, public
transportation, higher education, medical facilities, and alcohol and
tobacco production.87 Before privatizing, State enterprises converted
to joint-stock companies with a future plan of distributing shares to
the public.88
In 1992, Boris Yeltsin, the President of the Russian Federation,
introduced a program of voucher privatization called "mass privati-
zation."89 This privatization program tried to create wealthy citizens
who in turn would create a wealthy State.' As much as forty to fifty
84. See Anthony V. Raftopol, Russian Roulette: A Theoretical Analysis of
Voucher Privatization in Russia, 11 B.U. INT'L L.J. 435, 451 (1993) (reviewing
Russia's post-1991 economic plan).
85. See Kent F. Moors, The Failure of Russian Privatization 1992-1994: How
the Industrial Nomenclatura Prevented Genuine Reform, 3 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD.
1, 2 (1997) (describing the influence of the bureaucracy on the privatization proc-
ess in Russia).
86. Seeid. at6.
87. See id.
88. See Rutland, supra note 5, at 13 (describing Russia's 1992 privatization
program).
89. See Moors, supra note 85, at 17-30 (analyzing the State program and de-
scribing the effects of the program).
90. See id. at 30; see also Raftopol, supra note 84, at 450 (describing how the
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percent of State property was intended for privatization through
vouchers.9' Voucher privatization was touted as a democratic process
that would create millions of private owners. Many believed that re-
moving the managerial function from the State, and putting it into the
hands of individuals with a proprietary interest would create an in-
centive to make the enterprise efficient and profitable.i" The govern-
ment provided each citizen with one voucher worth 10,000 Rubles.'
Although vouchers were intended as a means of payment for the pur-
chase of either assets of State companies or shares of registered in-
vestment funds, they could also be traded in the market. ' Many citi-
zens did not expect to receive benefits from the investment of
vouchers since Russian citizens typically have low expectations of
their government. 95 Therefore, instead of participating in privatiza-
tion, citizens chose to simply sell their vouchers, giving others the
opportunity to obtain larger shares of the enterprises. Although the
mass selling of vouchers led to their rapid devaluation, this program
was claimed a success in terms of its scale: from the issuance of 150
million vouchers, the government collected 94 million vouchers and
40 million Russians became shareholders."
Legislation created favorable conditions for employees of privat-
izing enterprises. Employees were offered a buy-out program with
three different options. The first option granted the employee a one-
time opportunity to acquire up to twenty-five percent of the enter-
State program was intended to change the outlook of the Russian citizens by en-
couraging a sense of self-determination and individual accumulation of wealth).
91. See Privatization Progranune Implemented, ITAR-TASS, July 21, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS File.
92. See Fred Hiatt, Russia Starts Large-Scale Privatization: Eight Volgogard
Factories Put on the Auction Block, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1993, at A 12 (summa-
rizing the goals of the State Program for Privatization of State and Municipal En-
terprises in the Russian Federation for 1992).
93. See Raftopol, supra note 84, at 455 (describing the design, security protec-
tions and value of the vouchers that were distributed to all eligible citizens in Oc-
tober 1992).
94. See id. (explaining the options available to the voucher holder).
95. See id. at 450 (describing the nature of Russian citizens' attitude toward
government).
96. See Creating Private Enterprises and Efficient Markets. RUSSIA REFORM
MONITOR, Jan. 1995 (visited Apr. 7, 1999) <http://www.wired.com/collections/
multimedia/6.01 _st petersburg8.htm>.
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prise's stock in the form of privileged shares at no cost, and granted
the employee an option to purchase an additional ten percent of the
enterprise's stock in the form of ordinary shares at a thirty percent
discount from its nominal rate.97 The second option provided for the
acquisition of fifty-one percent of the shares at their nominal value.
The third option combined the previous two.98 Thus, if the workers
obtained a maximum of fifty-one percent of the company's stock,
and twenty percent of the stock went to the State, only twenty-nine
percent of the shares remained. These shares were sold at auction,
not for money, but rather for vouchers. 99
Besides citizens, there were other participants in the privatization
process. A right to participate in privatization and obtain title to por-
tions of State property went to investment funds and foreign inves-
tors. Investment funds acted as financial intermediaries in Russian
privatization, balancing citizens' vouchers on one side, and shares of
privatizing State enterprises on the other. For regulatory purposes,
the Russian government required investment funds to register with
the State Committee on State Property. Within a very short time,
there were 300 investment funds with 700 branches throughout Rus-
sia.' °° Despite a regulatory framework, some investment funds ex-
ploited people's trust by collecting large amounts of money and
vouchers, only to disappear without a trace.'0 '
Foreigners could participate in the privatization process, but their
role in mass privatization was limited by vague legislation. First,
legislation provided that a foreigner could not participate directly in
the privatization of medium-sized enterprises. This program was car-
ried out exclusively by vouchers.' 2 Vouchers, however, were freely
traded, which gave foreign investors an opportunity to purchase
them. This enabled some foreign companies, as well as Russian citi-
97. See Moors, supra note 85, at 28.
98. See id. at 29.
99. See Rutland, supra note 5, at 14 (analyzing the success of the Russian pri-
vatization program).
100. See Raftopol, supra note 84, at 464 (describing the rapid expansion of in-
vestment funds in Russia in 1992).
101. See id. at 464-65 (illustrating investment fund embezzlement).
102. See Changes in Soviet Balance of Power Boost Market Prospects,
PRIVATIZATION INT'L, Sept. 1, 1991, available in 1991 WL 2715792.
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zens, to acquire stock.03 Foreign investors played relatively minor
roles in the privatization of large enterprises.'
The scale of mass privatization in Russia was astounding. Ap-
proximately 85,000 small enterprises and around 14,000 medium and
large enterprises have been transferred to private hands. Close to 650
private investment funds collected nearly 94 million vouchers.' The
government held an estimated 11,200 voucher auctions.'6 In 1997-
1998, privatization continued with the sale of seventy large enter-
prises, some of which included oil, energy, and telecommunications
companies.'0 7
Privatization in Russia had many positive points. It broke State
monopolies and created an enormous number of private companies.
Yet there have been problems associated with the policies. First, pri-
vatization legislation created the "loans-for-shares" scheme. This
scheme privatized State companies by allowing private entities to fi-
nance their purchase."" Second, the creation of large State holding
companies in oil, gas, energy, and pipelines was problematic. Some
of these interests still remain in State possession, undermining the
development of the Russian economy. '°9 Third, rampant corruption
emerged and now dominates the Russian economy."0 Fourth, privati-
103. See Raftopol, supra note 84, at 462 (citing as an example of foreign par-
ticipation in mass privatization, a French company buying twenty percent of the
Prem concrete plant).
104. "Influential outside investors with a substantial amount of shares relative to
insider ownership are absent in Russia... ." Katharina Pistor, Privatization and
Corporate Governance in Russia: An Empirical Study', in PRIVATIZATION,
CONVERSION, AND ENTERPRISE REFORM IN RussiA 69 (Michael McFaul & Tova
Perlmutter eds., 1995) (finding that outside investors, including both foreign and
Russian investors other than employees and former employees of the enterprise,
acquired a mean of 19 percent of the total stock).
105. See Creating Private Enterprises and Efficient Markets, supra note 96.
106. See Rutland, supra note 5, at 14.
107. See Gibbon, supra note 62, at 16.
108. See Bruce Sterling, Art and Corruption, (visited Apr. 7, 1999)
<http://www.wired.comlcollections/multimedia/6.0 lstpetersbutg5.htm>.
109. See Moors, supra note 85, at 46 (describing the re-alignment of Russian oil
interests into 10 organizations, each of which is substantially owned and controlled
by the government).
110. See Daniel McGrory, Economic, Legal, and Political Dilemmas of Privati-
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zation was not transparent, as former factory managers, nomencla-
tura, and organized crime figures were able to concentrate a consid-
erable amount of State property."' A few "red directors" acquired
State enterprises by appropriating company funds to buy a control-
ling number of shares, or forcing workers to give up their shares."2
This appropriation was supported in significant part by the so-called
"Russian shadow," or informal economy."' Researchers assert that
these adverse features caused the Russian economy to crash during
the summer of 1998."
4
III. LEGAL ASPECTS OF PRIVATIZATION IN
KAZAKHSTAN
A. PRIVATIZATION LEGISLATION
"The affair can't be completed. Without difficulties nothing gets done, without
striving the goal can not be reached." Kazakh proverb'.
The Republic of Kazakhstan is one of the Central Asian republics
of the former Soviet Union ("USSR"). With a territory of 1,049,150
square miles, it is the second largest among the Commonwealth of
zation in Russia: Civilizing the Russian Underground Economy and Prospects for
Establishing a Civil Economy in Russia, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65
(1995) (tracing the link between the underground economy under the Soviet re-
gime and corruption in privatization efforts).
111. See J. Michael Waller, Author's Rebuttal to the Department of State, 5
DEMOKRATIZATSIYA: J. POST-SOVIET DEMOCRATIZATION pg. unavail. online
(1997) (on file with American University International Law Review).
112. See Raftopol, supra note 84, at 467; Rutland, supra note 5, at 14 (providing
an example where a director of one of the biggest Russian auto factories bought
thirty percent of the company's shares through fifteen fictional companies using
credits he obtained from banks).
113. See McGrory, supra note 110, at 71 (estimating that as much as forty per-
cent of Russians personal income is derived from illegal sources).
114. See Merton J. Peck, Russian Privatization: What Basics Does it Providefor
a Market Economy, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 27-31, 36-37
(1996).
115. Nursultan Nazarbaev, Speech on the Situation in the Country and Major
Directions of Domestic and Foreign Policy: Democratization, Economic and Po-
litical Reform for the New Century (Sept. 30, 1998) (visited Apr. 7, 1999)
<http://www.president.kz/main/mainframe.asp?Eng=en>.
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Independent States ("CIS")." 6 Its population is 16,672,000 people."'
Kazakhstan is rich in natural resources,'18 which, according to the
Constitution,1 9 belong to the Republic of Kazakhstan as a foundation
of its sovereignty and independence. Also, Kazakhstan's rich natural
resources play an important role in the success of its privatization ef-
forts by attracting both internal and external investors.
In early 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR-an
authorized body of the State at that time-issued an edict, "On Main
Directions of Destatization and Privatization of State Property in Ka-
zakh SSR." The Supreme Soviet declared destatization and privati-
zation" ° to be the most important condition for the transition of the
Kazakhstani economy to a free market system, strengthening the di-
versification of property rights, and developing entrepreneurial ac-
tivity.121 This edict divided all State property into three groups: prop-
erty of the USSR, property of the Kazakh SSR, and municipal
property."" Additionally, it established a State body for management
of privatization-the State Committee of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist
Republic on Management of State Property ("State Committee").' "
116. See GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT KAZAKHSTAN (visited Apr. 7, 1999)
<http://www.president.kz/main/mainframe.asp?Eng--en>.
117. See id.
118. See id. Kazakhstani fields of chromium, vanadium, bismuth, phosphorite,
and fluorine are known as the second largest in the world. See id. There are 160
known deposits of oil and gas, which contain approximately 20 billion barrels of
oil and seven hundred million tons of natural gas. See id.
119. See KAZAKHSTAN CONST. art. VI, sec. 3, available in CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 14 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1996) ("The land and
underground resources, waters, flora, and failure, other natural resources shall be
owned by the state.")
120. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (defining these terms at the
various stages of privatization).
121. See Postanovlenie Verhovnogo Soveta Kazakhskoi SSR, Ob osnovnih na-
pravleniah razgosudarstvlenia i privatizacii gosudarstvennoi sobsovennosti v Ka-
zakhskoi SSR [Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR, on the Gen-
eral Directions of Transformation and Privatization of State Property in Kazakh
SSR, Feb. 16, 1991], available in Kazakhstani Legislation database [hereinafter
Resolution on the General Directions of Privatization] (on file with American Uni-
versity International Law Review).
122. See id. sec. 4.1.
123. See id. sec. 4.
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The State Committee determined financial sources for privatization
and ascertained preferences to employees of the privatizing enter-
prises."'
In December 1991, the presidents of the eleven republics of the
former Soviet Union established the CIS and terminated the exis-
tence of the USSR.' 5 The USSR property located on the territories of
sovereign republics became the property of those republics.'26 This
agreement recognized a transfer of the property of the USSR, as well
as finances, enterprises, institutions, and subsidiaries, to the inde-
pendent States.'2 Thus, Kazakhstan acquired many resources of the
USSR, including mills, plants, military bases, and even nuclear arms.
The process of privatization was not easy for the Republic of Ka-
zakhstan. In addition to privatization, it had to declare private prop-
erty rights, create legislation for the operation of private enterprises,
establish methods for transferring State property to private parties,
regulate bankruptcy procedures, and address other important ques-
tions necessary for the functioning of a market economy. 8 The leg-
islature issued many laws and regulations during the first year of pri-
vatization. Among the most important were the Law on Destatization
and Privatization 129 and the Program of Destatization and Privatiza-
tion for 1991-1992.' 3o The legislation defined the main principles of
124. See id. secs. 5, 8.
125. See Letter dated 27 December 1991 from the Permanent Representative of
Belarus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR,
47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/60 (1991) (reporting the Alma Ata agreements that es-
tablished the Commonwealth of Independent States).
126. See, e.g., KAZAKHSTAN CONST. art. II, sec. 2, available in CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 11 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1996) ("The sover-
eignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan extends over its entire territory. The State
ensures integrity, inviolability and inalienability of its territory.").
127. See id.
128. See FOLSOM, supra note 15, at 893.
129. See Zakon Kazakhskoi SSR "0 pazgosudarstvlenii i privatizacii" ot 22
iynia 1991 goda [The Law on Destatization and Privatization, June 22, 1991],
available in Kazakhstani Legislation database [hereinafter Law on Privatization]
(on file with American University International Law Review).
130. See 0 Programme razgosudarstvleniya i privatizacii gosudarstvennoi
sobstvennosti v Kazakhskoi SSR na 1991-1992 god (I etap) [On the Program of
Destatization and Privatization of State Property in Kazakh SSR in 1991-1992
(First stage)], available in Kazakhstani Legislation database [hereinafter Program
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privatization as the following: publicity, competition, legal succes-
sorship, the responsibility of the State officials to carry out privatiza-
tion by transparent methods, and availability of information con-
cerning the property for sale to the Kazakhstani population. "'
Privatization was divided into three categories depending on the
number of employees: small-scale privatization, mass privatization
of medium-sized enterprises, and case-by-case privatization of large-
scale enterprises.12 Enterprises with not more than two hundred em-
ployees were called "small," those with not more than five thousand
employees were called "medium-sized," and large enterprises were
those that had more than five thousand employees.'
The process of privatization was divided into three stages. In the
first stage, the State focused its efforts on the privatization of small
enterprises, such as retail stores, wholesale companies, and service
facilities.' 34 In the second stage, in addition to small-scale privatiza-
tion, the State began mass privatization of medium-sized enterprises,
including privatization of agricultural entities.'35 Finally, in the third
stage, case-by-case privatization began.'3 Presumably, when privati-
of Privatization I Stage] (on file with American University International Law Re-
view).
131. See Decree Having Authority of Law of the President of the Republic of
Kazakhstan on Privatization, art. 4., Dec. 23, 1995 (visited Apr. 7, 1999)
<http://www.kazecon.kz/law/law-eng/PRIV-ENG.HTM> [hereinafter Decree on
Privatization].
132. See Program of Privatization I Stage, supra note 130, sec. 1 (outlining the
three privatization categories).
133. See Nacional'naya programma razgosudarstvlenia i privatizacii v Respub-
lild Kazakhstan na 1993-1995 godi (II etap), adobrena Ukazom Presidenta
Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 5 marta 1993 goda [National Program of Destatization
and Privatization in the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1993-1995 (II stage), approved
by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Mar. 5, 1993], available in Ka-
zakhstani Legislation database [hereinafter Program of Privatization 11 Stage] (on
file with American University International Law Review).
134. See Program of Privatization I Stage, supra note 130, sec. 1.
135. See Program of Privatization II Stage, supra note 133, sec. 1.
136. See Programma privatizacii i restructuruzacii gosudarstvennoi sobstvennoi
v Respubliki Kazakhstan na 1996-1998 godi (III etap), odobrena Postanovleniem
Pravitel'stva Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 27 fevralia, 1996 goda 246 [The Program
of Privatization and Restructuring of State Property in the Republic of Kazakhstan
in Feb. 27, 1997, No. 246], available in Kazahkstani Legislation database [herein-
after Program of Privatization III Stage] (on file with American University Inter-
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zation is complete, the private sector will dominate the Kazakhstani
137
economy.
1. First Stage of Privatization
In the first stage of privatization, the legislation distinguished the
term "destatization" from the term "privatization."'38 Destatization
means the transformation of State enterprises, including management
and corresponding functions, to private enterprises.'39 Enterprises
were transformed into joint-stock and limited liability companies
with State ownership. This process was similar to the transformation
of State property in other former Soviet countries. The definition of
"'privatization" means the acquisition of State property or shares of
State companies by private persons and legal entities.'40
Many entrepreneurs privatized State property at the beginning of
this period. The State Committee, its local branches, and municipal
bodies authorized the sale of State enterprises and property. 4' The
distribution of power among the State and municipal bodies nega-
tively affected privatization as a whole because the municipalities
pursued independent decisions that were more profitable for their re-
gions, while less profitable for the State as a whole. To counteract
this problem, the government passed amendments in 1993 that trans-
ferred privatization authority to the State Committee. To further
strengthen the power of the State Committee, its Chairman was
nominated Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic.
42
Small enterprises were sold at auctions, which were carried out
according to specific procedures. "4' Auctions were, as a rule, closed.
national Law Review).
137. See id. at introduction.
138. See Law on Privatization, supra note 129, art. 1.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. arts. 5, 6.
142. See Izmenenia v Zakon Kazakhskoi SSR "0 pazgosudarstvlenii i privati-
zaciii" ot 22 maya 1993 goda [The Amendments to the Law on Destatization and
Privatization May, 22, 1993], art. 10, available in Kazakhstani Legislation data-
base (on file with American University International Law Review).
143. See Polozenie ob organizatcii aukcionov, kommercheskih konkursov po
priobreteniy ob'ektov gosudarstvennoi sobstvennosti v ramkah maloi privatizacii,
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This essentially meant that participants sent their bids to the author-
ized body that later decided whose bid won.'" Citizens who resided
in Kazakhstan for at least five years and legal entities of the Republic
of Kazakhstan had an opportunity to participate in the first stage of
privatization.Y15 Employees of small enterprises had some advantages,
collectively they could obtain possession, a lease, or management
rights to the State enterprise in the process of destatization and re-
ceive ten percent of the shares of the privatizing enterprise at no
cost.*
6
Although almost all State property was subject to privatization,
unprofitable enterprises had to be sold first. Objects of exceptional
State property, including land, natural resources, security and mili-
tary interests, and other enterprises as determined by the Council of
Ministries, could not be privatized.'*' Enterprises within the Minis-
tries of Education, Public Health, Communications, Energy, Geol-
ogy, Mass-Media, and Aviation, and companies that produced poi-
sonous or toxic materials could not be privatized in the first stage. '
In addition to small-scale privatization and destatization of mid-
dle-size enterprises, the State sold its housing fund. Kazakhstani citi-
zens were converted into owners of their homes and apartments
through the privatization of the State housing fund.' 9 Privatization of
the State housing fund was achieved by using investment coupons,
which were given to citizens who permanently resided and worked in
the Republic of Kazakhstan.50 Possession of these coupons enabled
PostanovIenie Gosudaerstvennogo Komiteta Po Upravleniyu Gosimuschestvom
Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 4 aprelya 1993 goda [On Organization of Auctions, and
Tenders for Acquisition of State Property in Small Privatization, Apr. 4, 1993],
available in Kazakhstani Legislation database (on file with American University
International Law Review).
144. See Program of Privatization I Stage, supra note 130, sec. 2.
145. See id.
146. See id. sec. 3.
147. See id. sec. 7.
148. See id. sec. 8.
149. See id. sec. 6.
150. See Polozenie o kuponnom mehanizme privatizacii gosudarstvennoi sobso-
vennosti v Kazakhskoi SSR, odobreno Postanovieniem Presidenta Kazakhskoi
SSR ot 13 sentiabria 1991 goda 444 [On the Regulation of Coupon Mechanism of
Privatization of State Property in Kazakh SSR, approved by the Edict of the Presi-
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the holders to privatize State houses, as well as assets of agricultural
enterprises.' 5' One could assign his or her coupons only to direct
relatives as a gift or bequest.12 Presumably, the amount of coupons
given to each working citizen was approximately enough for privat-
izing an ordinary one-bedroom apartment or a house. If a coupon-
holder did not have enough coupons, he could pay the rest of the
price in cash.5 3 Case-by-case privatization at that time was moving
slowly, due to lengthy preparation of detailed evaluations and plans
for each item. Privatization in the agricultural sector was limited to
selling, leasing, or transferring assets of agricultural enterprises,
while agricultural land was barred from privatization."4
2. Second Stage of Privatization
Starting in 1993, the second stage of privatization ensued with
legislation providing for the complete privatization of small enter-
prises and the housing fund, as well as a continuation of the case-by-
case and agricultural complex privatization."' The State determined
that the main purpose of privatization in the second stage would be to
transfer medium-sized enterprises into private hands, through so
called "mass privatization." At least fifty-one percent of the ordinary
shares of middle-size companies were offered to Privatization In-
vestment Funds ("PIFs"), ten percent of privileged shares were given
at no cost to employees, and thirty-nine percent of the enterprise's
shares remained in State possession.1
6
Kazakhstan issued a different type of privatization investment
coupon for the acquisition of State enterprises during mass privatiza-
tion.' Unlike the coupons distributed in the first stage of privatiza-
dent of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Sept. 13, 1991, No. 444] sec. 1, para. 1, avail-
able in Kazakhstani Legislation database (on file with American University Inter-
national Law Review).
151. See id. para. 4.
152. See id. (noting that citizens were prohibited from selling their coupons).
153. See id. para. 11.
154. See Program of Privatization I Stage, supra note 130, sec. 7.
155. See Program of Privatization II Stage, supra note 133, at introduction.
156. See Twin-track Approach in Kazakhstan, PRIVATIZATION INT'L, Mar. 1,
1994, available in 1994 WL 2547365.
157. See Program of Privatization II Stage, supra note 133, art. 3.
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tion, private investment coupons ("PICs") were allocated among all
citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan in equal amounts during the
second stage of privatization.'" PICs could not be exchanged for
money and were deposited in special accounts in State banks.9 Leg-
islation prohibited coupon-holders from investing coupons directly
into a particular enterprise. The only way to use the coupons was to
give them to authorized PIFs, which could participate at auctions and
buy shares of State enterprises.'60 PIF accumulation of PICs served to
protect the shares of State enterprises from widespread dilution and
also reduced investment risks for each citizen."" The government
subjected PIFs to regulatory controls by limiting their activities to
securities investment. In addition, PIFs could not own more than
twenty percent of any enterprise or invest in affiliated companies.
PIFs could not issue bonds or possess more than five percent of all
issued PICs. 62 Although the government licensed two hundred PieFs
to participate in mass privatization, the twenty largest PIEFs collected
sixty percent of the issued coupons.'63 Coupon privatization was
complete in 1996, with the sale of 1700 State enterprises. " During
the third stage of privatization, PIEFs were transformed into mutual
fund and investment companies, and were thereby authorized to issue
securities and make diversified investments.""
At the end of the second stage of privatization, existing legislation
became outdated. As a result, the President of the Republic of Ka-
zakhstan issued the Decree Having Authority of Law of the President
of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Privatization ("De-
cree").' 66 The Decree re-evaluated the definition of privatization and
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See Nichols, supra note 8, at 313.
164. See Program of Privatization III Stage, supra note 136, at introduction.
165. Zakon Respublild Kazakhstan "Ob investitionnih fondah" ot 6 marta 1997
goda. [Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Investment Funds, Mar. 6, 1997]
art. 1, available in Kazakhstani Legislation database (on file with American Uni-
versity International Law Review).
166. Decree on Privatization, supra note 131. This Decree was issued when the
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nullified the term "destatization," since destatization was complete.'67
It defined privatization as the sale of State property to natural per-
sons and private and foreign legal entities by the State owner pursu-
ant to special procedures.'68 The subjects of privatization were State-
owned enterprises and institutions. The government could sell all or
part of the assets of an enterprise; subdivisions of an enterprise, and
stock or shares in charter funds of economic partnerships. 6 9 The
definition of the term "buyer" also changed. Legal entities, including
individuals, may be buyers, with the exception of those who (i) have
State ownership of more than twenty percent, or (ii) have no right to
participate in privatization according to the legislation of the Repub-
lic of Kazakhstan."70 There are also restrictions on purchases by joint-
stock companies. 7'
The Decree was novel in that it introduced two important envi-
ronmental provisions. Article 18 requires the seller in case-by-case
privatizations to disclose information about the ecological condition
of the property to a buyer.'72 In turn, the buyer can examine the envi-
ronmental condition of the property. 7 This provision is valid only
for case-by-case privatizations; therefore, hundreds of buyers of
smaller enterprises have no right to prove that assets of their com-
pany were polluted prior to purchase. They are, however, still liable
for damages to the environment and to the public health caused by
their purchased enterprise.7 7 Although the State assumes liability for
Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan was dissolved, and the President, ac-
cording to Article 1 of the law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "Concerning the
Temporary Delegation of Additional Authorities to the President of the Republic
of Kazakhstan and the Heads of Local Administrations," dated December 10,
1993, received additional authority. See id. preamble. The President was therefore
able to issue decrees, which have the authority of law.
167. See id. art. 1.
168. See id.
169. See id. art. 5.
170. See id. art. 2.
171. See id. (stating that a joint-stock company buyer may not purchase more
than twenty-five percent of shares in another joint-stock company which holds
some of the buyer's stock).
172. See Decree on Privatization, supra note 131, art. 18.
173. See id.
174. See id. art. 23.
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damage caused prior to privatization, it is almost impossible to de-
termine when damage occurred if the environmental evaluation was
not prepared during privatization of the enterprise."" Thus, this pro-
vision has created disparity among buyers, giving preference to buy-
ers of larger companies.
The Decree also provides that the sales agreement of an enterprise
could be declared invalid by the courts. 76 Such nullification of the
sales contract can occur if: (i) the buyer had no right to participate in
privatization, (ii) the buyer was granted illegal privileges and advan-
tages, (iii) the selling procedure was violated, and (iv) any other rea-
sons decided by the legislature within the Republic of Kazakhstan."
This provision, however, is only enforceable against buyers within
three years from the date of the conclusion of their privatization
agreements.' Dissolution of the agreement is also possible, and it
must be conducted under the procedures specified in the Civil Code
of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Parties must return everything ac-
quired under the dissolved agreement, and the culpable party must
reimburse the other party for its losses.7 9
The second stage of privatization was successful in terms of its
scale. The government sold hundreds of enterprises, including retail
stores, public catering and service companies,' drug stores, and a
number of gasoline stations."' Thousands of companies were trans-
ferred to employees.Y2 The program of mass privatization is com-
175. See id.
176. See id. art. 25.
177. See id.
178. See Decree on Privatization, supra note 131, art. 25. Actions to invalidate
an agreement may be brought by an interested entity or the Attorney General. See
id. A further restriction on the statute of limitations is that the action must be
brought within six months of the date the plaintiff knew, or should have known, of
the grounds for invalidation. See id.
179. See id. art. 26.
180. See Program of Privatization III Stage, supra note 136, at introduction.
181. See Privatization in Kazakhstan, in A BULLETIN ISSUED IN BEHALF OF THE
GKP-GKI IN KAZAKHSTAN, Jan./Feb. 1997 (visited Apr. 23, 1999) <http:JI
www.kazecon.kz/survey/CCF/ Febe.htm> (noting that there were small-scale pri-
vatization successes, including twenty-seven drug stores and twenty petroleum
stations).
182. See Nichols, supra note 8, at 312 (stating that it was usually small enter-
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plete as exemplified in the following situations: in case-by-case pri-
vatization, five enterprises were sold, forty-four enterprises were
transferred to management, and 93 percent of all agricultural enter-
prises were sold as well.
8 3
3. Third Stage of Privatization
The third stage of privatization began in 1996,' 4 with the goal of
selling approximately 200 to 250 large enterprises and 1000 strategic
enterprises.'85 Entities prohibited from sale in previous stages, such as
oil, gas, refining, power, mining, transport, communications, metal-
lurgy, health care, public education, science, and cultural enterprises,
were all subject to privatization in the third stage. 8 6 Since these en-
terprises and institutions were the biggest and most important for the
growth of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the government required a
thorough analysis of the "buyers" bids by all the relevant ministries,
State committees, and other central and local executive bodies.8 7
Privatization continued through a sale of State enterprises at auc-
tions or by the direct sale of an enterprise to the managing com-
pany. 88 The government conducted direct sales for large enterprises,
which in the preliminary phase were leased or given to management
with a buyout option.'89 An enterprise was given to management
when privatization of the enterprise was not expedient.9' Managers
prises that were transferred to their employees and declaring that more than 4,800
enterprises were transferred).
183. See Program of Privatization III Stage, supra note 136, at introduction.
184. See id.
185. See Emil Bukhman, The Cart Before the Horse: Anticipatory Securities
Regulation in Kazakhstan, 22 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 535, 542 (1997) (stating that
these companies will be subject to case-by-case privatization because each has fi-
nancial or regulatory uniqueness).
186. See Program of Privatization III Stage, supra note 136, sec. 2.
187. See id. sec. 3.
188. See id. sec. 1.
189. See id.
190. See Polozenie o konkurse po zaklucheniyu kontrakta na upravlenie pred-
priyatiem (ob'ektom), Prilozenie k Postanovleniyu Kabineta Ministrov Respubliki
Kazakhstan ot 20 iyulia 1993 goda 633 [On Tender For the Right to Manage an
Enterprise (Object), the Second Appendix to Resolution of Cabinet of Ministers of
the Republic of Kazakhstan, July 20, 1993, No. 633] sec. 3, available in Ka-
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of State enterprises, through incentive contracts, could buy an enter-
prise if it fulfilled performance obligations. 9 ' As many as forty of the
large enterprises particularly attractive to investors were privatized
through management contracts.9 2 The world's largest steel mill,
Karmet, as well as major copper, chrome and aluminum mills, and
oil and gas companies were sold to several foreign investors through
management contracts. 93 Legislation also permits cancellation of
management contracts if management fails to meet performance ex-
pectations. '9 The Kazakhstani government terminated contracts with
several managers complaining that they failed to make the necessary
investments and improvements while managing the companies.'"
Besides the direct sale of enterprises to managers, privatization
proceeded using auctions and tenders. In auctions, the winner is the
person who bids the highest price for the enterprise; in tenders, the
winner is the person who offers the best conditions for investment
into the enterprise, best management program, and so forth.96 All
zakhstani Legislation database (on file with American Universit) International
Law Review).
191. See id.
192. See Grigori A. Marchenko, The Development of the Corporate Securities
Market in Kazakhstan, June 1997, para. 12 (visited Apr. 20, 1999) <http//
www.kazecon.kz/Englishltender3.htm>. Mr. Marchenko was the Chairman of the
National Securities Commission in Kazakhstan. See id. He describes "management
contracts" as a form of de facto privatization, whereby an enterprise is managed by
an outside investor in return for a share in the enterprise's profits. See id. Typi-
cally, the investor makes contributions of working capital, employees, and other
investments for the enterprise. See id. This arrangement is also called a "manage-
ment trust," and the investor typically prepares the company for privatization. See
Nichols, supra note 8, at 315. Although the investor receives a share of the com-
pany's profits, if any, the real benefit it accrues is the ability to have the first op-
portunity to acquire the company once it is offered for sale. See id.
193. See Marchenko, supra note 192, para. 12 (stating that Karmet is fully-
owned by the British group, Ispat International, and that many other industrial en-
terprises are majority-owned by foreign investors).
194. See Nichols, supra note 8, at 316 (describing the Kazakhstani government's
dismissal of the first two managers of the Karmet steel mill).
195. See id. The first two Karmet management contracts were terminated due to
the failure of the managing company to make necessary investments to improve
the operation and productivity of the mill. See id. Once the current owner, Ispat
International, took over, productivity of the mill increased by 250 percent. See id.
196. See Decree on Privatization, supra note 131, art. 13.
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natural persons, private legal entities, and even foreign legal entities
that are registered for participation in an auction are allowed to bid.'97
Auctions in the last stage of privatization, unlike the first stage, were
open and transparent. Regulations required the authorized State
Committee to publish information on the enterprises to be privatized
in the official newspaper at least thirty days before the auction
date.' 98 Auctions were conducted according to the English method of
bidding-with price increases-and the Dutch method-with price
reductions.'99 The price of the privatizing enterprise, however, could
not be more than ten percent below a price determined by the gov-
ernment.2°°
Unlike privatization by auction, privatization through tenders was
not always transparent. Tenders were conducted by a group of offi-
cials without publication of alternative proposals. As a result, the
public did not know what particular criteria influenced the buyer's
choice. The tender winner was required to fulfill specific obligations,
such as replace obsolete equipment, make determined investments,
maintain a certain number of workers, or produce a specific kind of
good.0 1 For example, in 1997, the Kazakhstani government asked in-
vestment companies interested in "blue chip" enterprises in the oil,
gas, and telecommunications sectors to prepare their bid proposals." 2
A variety of investment banks and funds, among them ABN AMRO,
ING Barings, Salomon Brothers, Global Securities, Lazard Freres,
Peregrine, Regent Pacific, BZW Barclays, and HSBC, sent their pro-
posals from which the government chose the winners.2 ' There has
197. See id. art. 12.
198. See Regulation of the State Privatization Committee of the Republic of Ka-
zakhstan on the Procedure for the Sale of State Shares at Auctions, Feb. 7, 1996
(visited Apr. 20, 1999) <http://www.kazecon.kz/law/law-eng/amendm.htm> (out-
lining the information required to be published in the announcement). Addition-
ally, the announcement must be published in the press of the "oblast" where the
joint-stock company is located and where the auction will be held. See id.
199. See id. arts. 1.1.7, 1.1.8, 2.2, 3.3 (defining and describing the English and
Dutch auction processes).
200. See id. at amend. 1.
201. See Law on Privatization, supra note 129, art. 13.
202. See Nurdin Damitov, "Blue Chip " Program of the Republic of Kazakhstan
(visited Apr. 20, 1999) <http://www.kazecon.kz//English/bluechip.htm>.
203. See id. (stating that agreements for the tender of Kazakhstan's first four
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been criticism, however, that the government gives unfair advantages
to these foreign investors.3 4 For example, the chrome supplier,
Kazchrome, which had a 1995 annual profit of over S145 million,
was sold to a foreign investor for $36.8 million through a tender.2' '
Such practices have given rise to concern among privatization par-
ticipants about its transparency and fairness.
The State uses privatization proceeds differently depending on the
circumstances. During the early stages of privatization, money was
distributed among the State Reserve Fund, the State Fund on Eco-
nomic Stabilization, and the Special Fund of the Kazakh SSR on
Management of State Property.?'° Subsequent legislation authorized
the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan to determine where the
money would go.20' Presently, the Decree on Privatization specifies
that funds received from the sale of State property are to be included
in the State's revenues of the State budget, and are to be spent ac-
cording to the Law on the State Budget of the Republic of Ka-
zakhstan.2 08 Thus, privatization money, which was formerly distrib-
uted to a large number of institutions, is now concentrated in the
budget and is allocated according to budgetary needs.
Privatization in Kazakhstan is almost complete. The program of
privatization in the third stage provides for some post-privatization
measures. Those measures, which can be taken by the government,
include: (i) State guarantees for privatized enterprises in all forms of
economic support and technical assistance, and (ii) State training
programs for managers and specialists of privatized enterprises on
how to operate in a market economy.:09 The State also plans to foster
"blue chip" companies were concluded by April 17, 1998).
204. See Nichols, supra note 8, at 319 (describing potential problems and ad-
vantages which foreign investors may face when attempting to enter the Ka-
zakhstan market).
205. See id. The author notes, however, that the low purchase price may be a re-
sult of external factors such as the investing company's assumption of debt or the
Kazakhstan government's eagerness to privatize the company quickly. See id.
206. See Resolution on the General Directions of Privatization, supra note 12 1,
para. 9.
207. See Law on Privatization, supra note 129, art. 23.
208. See Decree on Privatization, supra note 131, art. 20.
209. See Program of Privatization III Stage, supra note 136, sec. 4.
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the growth of the securities market by creating a network of profes-
sional market participants, and improving the efficiency of stock ex-
change operations.10
B. PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE PRIVATIZATION
IN KAZAKHSTAN
In many post-Communist countries, privatization could not be
successful without attracting foreign capital and foreign manage-
ment. Foreign participation helps to introduce new technology and
establish adequate systems of management and quality control."'
Generally, foreign direct investment plays "key roles in stimulating
economies of developing states" and is seen as an "engine of
growth. '' 12 Governments attract foreign investors by providing dif-
ferent advantages, such as location of the enterprise, favorable tax
rates and regulatory regimes, as well as political and economic sta-
bility of the particular country." 3
In Kazakhstan, the President has repeatedly emphasized that for-
eign investment and strong foreign relations are essential for the ef-
fective development of Kazakhstani natural resources.214 He also
stated that the foreign policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan aims to
create and maintain strong external connections to achieve a success-
ful realization of economic objectives, social and political stability,
and peaceful relations." 5 Since Kazakhstani policy is to attract for-
eign investors, legislation is intended to create a favorable invest-
ment climate. Researchers note that compared to other CIS republics,
investment in Kazakhstan carries relatively low risk."6 As such, for-
210. See id. sec. 5.
211. See Anderson, supra note 30, at 126.
212. Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and Regulation of Foreign Di-
rect Investment: The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3 (1995).
213. See id. at 10-14 (outlining different incentives for investors to invest
abroad).
214. See State: Foreign Policy Pursued by Kazakhstan: Extract from President
Nursultan Nazarbaev's Speech on Foreign Policy Issues, Feb. 15, 1995 (visited
Apr. 20, 1999) <http://www.president.kz/main/mainframe.asp?Eng=en>.
215. See id.
216. See Twin-track.Approach in Kazakhstan, supra note 156 (citing findings by
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eign direct investment in Kazakhstan had already reached USS 1.2
billion by 1996.217 In 1998, the Kazakhstani State Budget alone re-
ceived US$17.6 million in contributions from foreign investors,
while the total amount of foreign direct investment reached
US$184.9 million.2 8
Foreigners participated in Kazakhstan's privatization process since
its inception. The Law on Destatization and Privatization allowed
citizens of foreign States and foreign legal entities with offices in
Kazakhstan to purchase assets or stock of privatizing enterprises, but
excluded them from acquiring small enterprises in the first stage of
privatization.2'9 Later, the government enacted special legislation that
eliminated restrictions on foreign participation in small-scale privati-
zation and reinforced foreign participation in case-by-case privatiza-
tion on the basis of open competition with local investors.2, The
1995 Edict of the State Committee for State Property reflects un-
precedented Kazakhstani efforts to create a favorable climate for for-
eign participation in small-scale privatization. The Edict provided
foreign investors with an opportunity to participate in special auc-
tions held exclusively for foreign investors.'" Foreign participation in
mass privatization of middle-size enterprises, however, was still lim-
the accounting firm KPMG's Policy Economics Group).
217. See Privatization in Kazakhstan, supra note 181.
218. See NATIONAL STATISTICAL AGENCY OF THE REP. OF KAZAKHSTAN,
STATISTICAL BULLETIN NO. 3, at 84 (1998).
219. See Law on Privatization, supra note 129, art. 8.
220. See "Ob uchastii inostrannyh investorov v processe privatizacii gosu-
darstvennoi sobstvennosti v Respublike Kazakhstan", prilozenie No7 k Postanov-
leniyu Kabineta Ministrov Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 20.07.93 goda 633 [On Par-
ticipation of Foreign Investors in the Process of Privatization of State Property in
the Republic of Kazakhstan, appendix to the Edict of Cabinet of Ministers of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, July 20, 1993, No. 633], available in Kazakhstani Legis-
lation database [hereinafter Foreign Investors in the Process of Privatization] (on
file with American University International Law Review).
221. See Polozenie o poriadke uchastiya inostrannih investorov v processe pri-
vatizacii ob'ektov gosudarstvennoi sobstvennosti v ramkah maloi privatizacii,
postanovlenie Gosudarstvennogo Komiteta Respubliki Kazakhstan po Gosu-
darstvennomu Imuschestvu ot 24 yanvaria 1995 [On Participation of Foreign In-
vestors in a Process of Small-scale Privatization in the Republic of Kazakhstan,
approved by the Ordinance of the State Committee for State Property, Jan. 24,
1995], available in Kazakhstani legislation database (on file with American Uni-
versity International Law Review).
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ited for the sake of the Kazakhstani population. Foreigners could not
establish PIFs, purchase more than thirty percent of the shares of
PIFs, or control more than a thirty-five percent market share of cer-
tain goods.2 Nonetheless, once the PICs were allocated to the PIFs
and once trading of securities by PIFs began, foreigners were able to
purchase shares and assets of former State companies."223
Kazakhstani legislation guarantees foreigners the freedom of en-
trepreneurial activities by prohibiting the illegal interference of en-
trepreneurial activity by State officials who have supervisory func-
tions."' State officials who commit illegal acts are subject to
dismissal from the State service and imposition of penalties in accor-
dance with the administrative and criminal legislation of the Repub-
lic of Kazakhstan. 5
The Law on State Support of Direct Investments in the Republic
of Kazakhstan fostered a favorable climate for foreign direct invest-
ment.2 6 The goal of this law was to accelerate the development of the
production of goods, works, and services in the cardinal sectors of
the economy.227 The law broadly defines foreign direct investment,
but excludes those investments involving sovereign guarantees of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, or those given as an official technical sup-
port or grant.2 8 The State guarantees the security of investment ac-
222. See Foreign Investors in the Process of Privatization, supra note 220, sec.
2.2.
223. See Twin-track Approach in Kazakhstan, supra note 156.
224. See Ukaz Presidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan "0 dopolnitel'nyh merah po
realizacii gosudarstvennih garantii cvobodi predprinimatel'skoi deiatel'nosti" 14
iunia 1996 goda [Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Addi-
tional Measures for Implementation of the State Guarantees of the Freedom of En-
trepreneurial Activities, June 14, 1996], available in Kazakhstani Legislation data-
base (on file with American University International Law Review).
225. See id. sec. 1.
226. See Zakon "0 gosudarstvennoi podderzke priamyh investicii v Respubliki
Kazakhstan" ot 28 fevralia 1997 goda, [Law on State Support of Direct Invest-
ments in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Feb. 28, 1997], available in Kazakhstani
Legislation database [hereinafter Law on State Support of Direct Investments] (on
file with American University International Law Review).
227. See id. art. 5.
228. See id. art. 2.
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tivities,'29 protects investors assets from repatriation and expropria-
tion, safeguards investors from unscrupulous State officials, allows
free transfer of capital and convertibility of currency, and includes
choice of law provisions to insulate investors from amendments and
additions to Kazakhstani laws.3 Kazakhstan also established a sys-
tem of economic privileges for investors, including tax relief during
the first five years and a reduction of taxes up to fifty percent in the
following five years. The law also provides full or partial relief from
tariffs on imported equipment and materials necessary for the devel-
opment of the investment.2" Although Kazakhstani legislation has
opened its economy for investment, some sectors, such as telecom-
munications, electrical infrastructure, oil and gas, agricultural, live-
stock and fertilizers, and investment in the new Kazakhstani capital,
Astana, have an even more favorable regulatory regime.-
2
The aforementioned privileges for foreign investors, however, are
applicable only to those investors who conclude investment contracts
with the authorized State Committee. Parties to a contract stipulate
all grants and privileges to be given to a particular investor.2 Legis-
lation specifies the terms and conditions required for the conclusion
of the investment contract. As such, despite Kazakhstan's attractive
investment incentives, investors are concerned about some issues.
First, although legislation requires transparency in investment con-
tracts and full disclosure of all documents related to planned invest-
ment,' " some foreign investors purchased large enterprises in Ka-
zakhstan for a fraction of their real value.2" Second, bribery of State
229. See id. art. 4.
230. See id. art. 8.
231. See id. arts. 8-9.
232. See State Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Investments, Reso-
lution on the approval of The Regulations on the Procedure of Admittance of Ap-
plications from Investors for Obtaining Privileges and Preferences for the Invest-
ment Project Implementation and Application for Obtaining Privileges and
Preferences for the Investment Project Implementation (visited Apr. 23, 1999)
<http://www.kazecon.kzllawllaw-eng/3.html> (listing the Kazakhstani govern-
ment's preferential areas for foreign direct investment).
233. See Law on State Support of Direct Investments, supra note 226, art. 12.
234. See id. art. 10.
235. See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text (detailing the purchase of a
Kazakhstani business by foreign investors for a fraction of its worth).
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officials is still a potential problem, although it may be better pre-
vented with increased enforcement of the new Law on Fight with
Corruption, enacted July 1998.
CONCLUSION
Kazakhstan has experienced both immediate and intermediate
forms of privatization. In terms of the amount of property involved
and the diversity of forms and methods, Kazakhstani privatization is
comparable only with the Russian programs.
Kazakhstan employed a variety of privatization methods. They in-
clude small-scale, mass, and large-scale privatization, governed by
the central State bodies with payment by cash or by investment cou-
pons. State property was transferred to its new owners by auctions,
tenders, or directly to employees at no cost, or for a nominal charge.
Legislation shaped privatization into three distinct stages. In the first
stage of privatization, the Kazakhstani laws emphasized the sale of
small enterprises, frequently to their workers, and the sale of State
houses to current tenants. In the second stage, the government em-
phasized mass privatization of medium-size enterprises that were
sold at auctions with payment by investment coupons. The govern-
ment expects privatization to be complete in the third and final stage
with the sale of large and strategic enterprises. Foreign companies
and natural persons have been encouraged to participate in this stage.
Legislation has provided equal treatment of local and foreign partici-
pants in privatization. It has also guaranteed a favorable regime for
foreign investors, free convertibility of currency, free transfer of
capital, permanent legislation for investors, and the free exercise of
property rights.
Finally, privatization in Kazakhstan changed the system of the na-
tional economy. It was an engine of institutional, legislative, organ-
izational, and social change. It is, therefore, appropriate to say that at
the end of privatization, Kazakhstan has developed completely new
legislation and created new institutions. Its legislation now reflects
the world's experience and provides for continuing changes in the
Kazakhstani economy toward a free market with private property.
Scholars have differing opinions concerning what constitutes a
successful privatization effort. Some scholars consider privatization
to be successful depending upon how State property is allocated to
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private hands, while others regard privatization success depending
upon the amount of property privatized in the process. Consequently,
some researchers, pointing out such negative features as corruption
in the process of privatization, non-transparency, and allocation of
State property in the hands of a shadow economy, assert that the
whole privatization process has failed. ' -16 Others, however, believe
privatization has succeeded if almost all State property has been pri-
vatized, despite some negative features, and has failed if many enter-
prises still remain in a State's possession.' Accordingly, the latter
argue that the task of privatization is simply to convert State enter-
prises into private companies using a variety of market mechanisms
that make the economy more efficient28
Considering privatization in Kazakhstan from both points of view,
it can be inferred that Kazakhstani privatization is a success. There is
little evidence of unfairness and non-transparency, almost all State
property was privatized, new legislation for support of market
mechanisms was enacted, and new institutions were created. Fur-
thermore, Kazakhstani State institutions and currency are stable.
Moreover, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan declared his
adherence to the principles of building a democracy with a market
economy by means of stable exterior and interior policies2" He
pledged that Kazakhstani citizens would gather the fruits of the State
reforms soon.240
236. See, e.g., Moors, supra note 85, at 51-52; Raftopol, supra note 84, at 467;
Sterling, supra note 108.
237. See, e.g., William C. Philbrick, The Task of Regulating Investment Funds in
the Formerly Centrally Planned Economies, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 539, 552-57
(1994) (describing the successes and failures of privatization in Hungary, the
Czech Republic and Russia); Sachs Intervie; supra note 8, at 456-57 (proposing a
system where companies are partially privatized immediately by the government
giving up to fifty percent of the company's shares to its employees and the general
public).
238. See Sachs Interview, supra note 8, at 454-58 (expressing concern that tra-
ditional privatization by public offering is time consuming and may result in cor-
porate waste while the ownership of the company is in transition).
239. See Innaguratcionnaya Rech: Presidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan [The
Speech of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Inauguration Cere-
mony], KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAvDA, Jan. 21, 1999, at 1.
240. See id.
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In conclusion, the results of Kazakhstan's enormous privatization
effort will be clearer in time. Privatization has been one of the most
important steps for the Republic of Kazakhstan in order to extinguish
its Soviet legacy. Today, the private sector dominates the Ka-
zakhstani economy and, consequently, the country achieved one of
the steps toward its goal of building a prosperous future.
